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APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: DOING BUSINESS
ON BUSINESS TERMS
Although not entirely unwilling to draw upon the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC) to resolve federal government contracting dis-
putes when federal law otherwise is silent,I federal courts and boards
1. To achieve uniformity in the absence of specific contrary federal precedent, the federal
boards of contract appeals, see note 2 infra, often have relied upon uniform state acts,
frequently having referred to the Uniform Sales Act (USA) as a source of law governing
federal contracts. In F.W. Lang Co., ASBCA No. 1677, 57-1 B.C.A. % 1334, the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals stated: "The contract does not provide for any particular
form of notice of defects; so the general rules applicable to the giving of notice of defects at
common law and under Sec. 49 of the Uniform Sales Act may be applied as a guide." Id. at
4264. The panel in J.R. Simplot Co., ASBCA No. 3952, 59-1 B.C.A. 2112, agreed that the
USA's provisions for notice within a reasonable time were "expressive of Federal law and..
applicable to Government contracts." Id. at 9069.
The Interior Board of Contract Appeals recognized in General Electric Co., IBCA No. 451-
8-64, 66-1 B.C.A. 5507, that the boards should not apply the USA automatically, noting
that the Court of Claims "has both applied and refused t apply the provisions of the Uniform
Sales Act depending upon whether, in the court's view, the underlying policy was consonant
with established principles of law for the determination of controversies to which the Govern-
ment is a party." Id. at 25,792 (citations omitted). This statement by the Interior Board of
Contract Appeals, however, does not support the proposition that a federal rule of contract
law must defeat a uniform state rule. For the assertion that the Court of Claims would not
apply the USA, General Electric Co. relied solely upon a case where the proferred USA
argument was inapplicable in itself. In Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. United States, 172 F.
Supp. 268 (Ct. Cl. 1959), the plaintiff relied upon USA section 49 which provided: "[lf, after
acceptance of the goods, the buyer fail[s] to give notice to the seller of the breach of any
promise or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such
breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor." Id. at 270. The plaintiff raised section 49 in
defense to the Government's counterclaim for overpayment. The provision was inapplicable
because it failed to answer the Government's restitutionary theory of recovery. Id. One inter-
pretation of Fansteel is that the court was referring to law which is outcome-determinative.
While being determinative, federal law nonetheless may draw from appropriate state law that
does not conflict with federal interests.
The various boards of contract appeals have provided the more widely enacted UCC even
greater application in federal contract disputes than they did the USA. Reeves Soundcraft
Corp., ASBCA Nos. 9030 & 9130,1964 B.C.A. 4317, presents the foremost decision in which
the Armed Services Board promoted the UCC. The Board agreed with an assertion of the
Court of Claims that ". . . the federal contract law. . should take account of the best in
modem decision and discussion." Padbloc Co. v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 369, 377 (1963),
cited in Reeves Soundcraft Corp., ASBCA Nos. 9030 & 9130, 1964 B.C.A. 4317, at 20,877.
See also notes 57-61 infra.
See also Kain Cattle Co., ASBCA No. 17124, 73-1 B.C.A. 9999; Catalytic Eng'r & Mfg.
Corp., ASBCA No. 15257, 72-1 B.C.A. 9342; Cross Aero Corp., ASBCA No. 14801, 71-2
B.C.A. 119075; Council Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 14232, 71-1 B.C.A. 8731; Keco Indus., Inc.,
ASBCA No. 13271, 714 B.C.A. 8727; Cottman Mechanical Contractors, Inc., ASECA No.
11387, 67-2 B.C.A. 6566; Stanley Aviation Corp., ASBCA No. 11430, 67-1 B.C.A. 1 6302;
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of contract appeals2 have been intransigent in their refusal to settle
any conflicts between the Code and the federal common law of
contracts3 in favor of the Code. Based partially upon the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution4 and partially upon general
principles of stare decisis,5 this disinclination to review even thread-
bare federal precedents in light of the Code's teachings primarily
has been defended as having been mandated by the Supreme
Skaggs Automotive, Inc., ASBCA No. 11274, 66-2 B.C.A. % 5744; General Elec. Co., IMCA
No. 451-8-64, 66-1 B.C.A. 5507; Productions Unlimited, Inc., VACAB No. 541, 66-1 B.C.A.
5444; General Elec. Co., BCA No. 442-6-64, 65-2 B.C.A. 1 4974; Carpenter Steel Co.,
AECBA No. 5-65, 65-1 B.C.A. 9 4848; Federal Pac. Elec. Co., BCA No. 334, 1964 B.C.A. %
4494; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., ASBCA No. 9647, 1964 B.C.A. 9 4399; Reeves Soundcraft
Corp., ASBCA Nos. 9030 & 9130, 1964 B.C.A. 14317; Noonan Const. Co., ASBCA No. 8320,
1963 B.C.A. 9 3638.
Moreover, the boards have agreed that the UCC is a source of federal law applicable to
warranties in government contracts. See Haddock, Uniform Commerical Code Warran-
ties-Application to Government Purchases, 1 Pu. CoNT. L.J. 77 (1968).
2. The various boards represent their executive department heads in hearing and deciding
contract disputes. See generally Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals, 29 LAW & CoNTEMn. PROB. 39, 42-57 (1964).
3. The federal common law of United States government contracts is decisional law devel-
oped since Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), aided by decisions
applying the general common law that existed before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
4. As explained by the Court in United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944),
the supremacy clause mandates application of federal law to federal contracts according to
the following rationale:
The Constitution provides that "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States *** ." Art. IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2. It also gives
Congress the power "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution" all powers vested in the Government or in any depart-
ment or officer thereof, Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 18, and it makes the laws of the United
States enacted pursuant thereto "the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Art. VI, cl. 2.
Every acquisition, holding, or disposition of property by the Federal Govern-
ment depends upon proper exercise of a constitutional grant of power . . ..
[This disputed contract] must be accepted as an act of the Federal Govern-
ment warranted by the Constitution and regular under statute.
Procurement policies so settled under federal authority may not be defeated
or limited by state law. The purpose of the supremacy clause was to avoid the
introduction of disparities, confusions and conflicts which would follow if the
Government's general authority were subject to local controls.
322 U.S. at 182-83. The doctrine that the exercise of a constitutional function makes a
contract subject to federal law also applies to subcontracts and to those further down the
chain, where the federal interest is sufficient. See American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640, 644 (9th Cir. 1961).
5. See note 12 infra & accompanying text.
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Court's refusal to apply state law to federal commercial transactions
in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States8 and United States v. Alle-
gheny County.7 The Court in Clearfield expressed its rationale for
rejecting the application of state law as follows: "The application
of state law. . . would subject the rights and duties of the United
States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity
in results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries
of the laws of the several states."
Wide adoption of the Code,' replacing the "vagaries of the laws
of the several states," calls into question the continuing validity of
these justifications for refusing to apply the UCC to federal govern-
ment contracts. So long as the Code is used as a source of federal
law, rather than as an application of state law to a federal contract,
the supremacy clause raises no bar at all. Moreover, while the doc-
trine of stare decisis is not to be regarded lightly, its invocation in
the refusal to review federal contract law has been premised upon
the rejection of state law in Clearfield and Allegheny. Excessive
attention to the results reached in those two cases with insufficient
6. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). The United States sued a presenting bank which the United States
had paid on a check bearing the forged endorsement of the payee. Applicable state law
arguably prevented recovery by the United States because it had delayed unreasonably in
giving notice of the forgery, id. at 366, but the Supreme Court declined to apply state law,
reasoning that since the United States issued vast quantities of commercial paper in many
states, diversity of state law would create uncertainty about the rights and duties of the
United States. Id. at 366-67. The Court also based its application offederallaw on the exercise
of the constitutional power to issue the check. Id. See note 4 supra.
7. 322 U.S. 174 (1944). The contractor installed additional equipment pursuant to its
contract with the United States for the production of ordnance. Under the agreement, title
to the equipment was in the United States. The state of Pennsylvania subsequently included
the value of the equipment among the contractor's property for the computation of state
taxes. Id. at 177-80. The state supreme court held that, as a matter of state law, the contractor
was to be assessed for taxes on the equipment and whether title was in the United States
was irrelevant. Appeal of Mesta Machine Co., 347 Pa. 191, 32 A.2d 236 (1943). The Supreme
Court reversed asserting that state taxation of goods to which the United States held title
violated the Constitution. See note 4 supra.
. S. 318 U.S. at 367. See also United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174,183 (1944):
"The validity and construction of contracts,. . . their consequences on the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties, the titles or liens, which they create or permit, all present questions of
federal law not controlled by the law of any State." But see 37 Comp. GEN. 412, 415 (1937):
"In the instant case, the contract was entered into and performed in the State of Illinois and
therefore the laws of that jurisdiction-insofar as they do not conflict with Federal law or
statute-are for application in determining the rights of the parties."
9. Louisiana is the only state which has not enacted the Code. See UNtoPm CONNCmL
CoDE, Table 1 (1972 version). On Jan. 1, 1975, articles 1, 3, 4, and 5 became effective in that
state, also. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:1-101 to 5-117 (West Supp. 1975).
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attention to the uniformity rationale has led federal courts and
boards of contract appeals to overlook the possibility of achieving
the goals enunciated in Clearfield and Allegheny while drawing
upon UCC doctrines that better reflect modem commercial deal-
ings. Even with this illusory bar dispelled, however, difficulties re-
main in finding an appropriate method for establishing the Code as
a source of federal law to be applied consistently to federal con-
tracts.
The Reluctance To Draw upon State Law
Federal courts have been most disinclined to follow the teachings
of the Uniform Commercial Code when they have perceived a direct
conflict between the result mandated by a Code provision and that
indicated by specific federal precedent. Federal Electric Corp. v.
-United States"0 presented, at least.to the Court of Claims, such a
conflict between the federal rule and the Code approach. Regarding
itself bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Willard, Sutherland
& Co. v. United States,"1 the court rejected the proffered UCC ap-
proach which it found to conflict with Willard:
Though we might find persuasive the contemporary view of per-
formance under protest as restated in section 1-207 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code and accepted by the court under the
special circumstances of the Northern Helex case, we hesitate
to extend this view in the face of a clear, contrary rule estab-
lished and affirmed, albeit a half century ago, by the Supreme
Court. We are reminded in this connection of the Court's recent
expression of 'difficulty in comprehending how decisions by
lower courts can ever undermine the authority of a decision of
[the Supreme] Court.' -12
10. 486 F.2d 1377 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 136 (1974). After entering into a
contract with the Government, the corporate contractor discovered that its calculations were
mistaken and that it would suffer unanticipated losses if the Government carried out the
option contract. Before the expiration of the contract period, the contractor notified the
Government of its predicament and attempted to end its obligation to supply generators. The
contractor stressed that if the Government required it to proceed, it would continue only
under protest. The Government continued its orders and Federal Electric met them under
protest. After the contract ended, the contractor filed actions with the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals, challenging the validity of several delivery orders. The Board denied the
appeals. Federal Elec. Corp., ASBCA Nos. 11726, 11918 & 12161, 68-1 B.C.A. 6834. The
contractor thereafter obtained review in the Court of Claims.
11. 262 U.S. 489 (1923).
12. 486 F.2d at 1382, citing Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 455 F.2d 546 (Ct. Cl.
[Vol. 16:395
1974] BUSINESS ON BUSINESS TERMS
The Court of Claims therefore concluded that even if the contract
had been unenforceable at execution, the contractor nevertheless
was barred from contract price adjustment to the extent that it had
performed the otherwise unenforceable contract;"3 that the perform-
ance was under protest was deemed irrelevant.14
The refusal to resort to the Uniform Commercial Code has ex-
tended even to instances when the United States expressed an in-
tent to have the contract governed by Code provisions. United
States v. Sommerville'5 concerned a government contract security
provision which made specific reference to Code section 9-503 as a
cumulative remedy. 6 Nevertheless, the court of appeals was reluc-
1972), and quoting United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 396 (1973).
UNIORM CohmemnL CODE § 1-207 provides in part: "A party who with explicit reservation
of rights performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded
or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved." The court
rejected the contractor's argument that Northern Helex changed the" Willard rule, distin-
guishing the 1972 case on the grounds of its special circumstances, "the processing and storing
of helium, a valuable national resource, as a by-product of another chemical process." 486
F.2d at 1382.
13. Id. at 1381.
14. See note 10 supra.
Accepting the reasoning that the contract was enforceable ab initio, the concurring opinion
both presents a sounder rationale for the decision and avoids "ignorling] what we call 'the
contemporary view of performance under protest."' 486 F.2d at 1384. The majority opinion
failed to mention a letter, see ASBCA Nos. 11726, 11918 & 12161, 68-1 B.C.A. 6834, at
31,592, which the contractor wrote before it communicated its formal reservation of rights.
The unmentioned letter clearly indicated that the contractor knew the contract was valid ab
initio. Id. at 31,596-97. Moreover, by focusing upon whether the contract was enforceable ab
initio, the concurring opinion avoided facing the conflict which the majority found between
federal precedent and UCO section 1-207, a conflict that was illusory. Code section 1-207
provides no support for the contractor on the facts of Federal Electric since, as the contrac-
tor's cited case of Northern Helex indicates, 455 F.2d at 552-53, the provision does not "create
a remedy because a remedy for the seller, when the buyer breaches, already exists under the
law ... ." Id. at 553, citing Um oRoi COMMERCIA. CODE §§ 2-703, 2-704. Since the Govern-
ment was not a breaching party, Federal Electric had no remedy which section 1-207 could
preserve and no conflict existed.
15. 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964). The United States brought
an action for conversion, seeking to recover the value of livestock that an auctioneer sold. The
Farmers Home Administration (FHA) had an interest in the animals through a security
agreement. See note 90 infra.
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-503 (1970) provides:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed a sebured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may
require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the se-
cured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably
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tant to "subject federal rights and duties to . . . the exceptional
uncertainty and heterogeneity" that it assumed could arise from
resort to state law.17 The court emphasized the necessity for uni-
formity in federal government transactions, but failed to consider
whether the UCC would provide that uniformity. 8
Failure to analyze the uniformity requirement of Clearfield also
affected the decision of a federal district court in United States v.
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association."5 Unlike the
court in Sommerville, however, the court in Bank of America did
not apply federal law merely because it was available; the court
explained that the reason for reliance upon federal law was the
federal government's interest in protecting public moneys.20 Defend-
ing an action against it by the Government, the presenting bank
argued that UCC section 3-405(1) (c) 21 should control the case by its
analogous application, since federal courts should follow the general
common law in fashioning federal law. 2 The district court, however,
rejected resort to the Code, reasoning that even a uniform state law
convenient to both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equip-
ment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under
Section 9-504.
(2) If a secured party elects to proceed by process of law he may proceed by
writ of replevin or otherwise.
Subsection (2) was added to section 9-503 in Pennsylvania and two other states. See MD. ANN.
CODE art. 95B, § 9-503 (1964); UTAH CODn ANN. § 70A-9-503 (1968).
17. 324 F.2d at 717. The court also emphasized the federal nature of the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties arising under the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1005(d), 1006, 1006(d), 1007, 1008-1012, 1014-1025, 1027-1029 (1970).
The concurring opinion regarded the majority's reliance on Clearfield as misplaced, arguing
that the rights protected in Sommerville had their origin in state law. The concurrence found
an express congressional purpose to apply state law from the terms of the FHA-approved
agreement since it was both a financing statement and a security agreement under the
Pennsylvania law. 324 F.2d at 720-21.
18. The superiority of the UCC approach to the issue was not involved because both the
Code and federal decisional law supported the Government. See note 16 supra.
19. 288 F. Supp. 343 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
864 (1971). The United States sued the Bank of America to recover moneys that it had paid
the bank. A number of government checks with forged endorsements of the payee's name were
presented to the bank which innocently cashed them. The Government subsequently reim-
bursed the bank for the sums paid out. In its suit, the Government claimed that the bank
breached the expressed and implied warranties of the prior endorsements and thatrepayment
of the money was by mutual mistake.
20. Id at 348.
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §3-405(1)(c) provides: "An indorsement by any person in
the name of named payee is effective if. . . an agent or employee of the maker or drawer
has supplied him with the name of the payee intending the latter to have no such interest."
22. 288 F. Supp. at 345.
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was inapplicable because the federal government's interest in pro-
tecting its commercial paper outweighed the interest in state and
federal uniformity which utilization of the UCC would accomplish.
The court accepted the Government's argument that the business-
risk rationale of the UCCm was "not in point; public moneys need
protection more than the presenting bank's assets."u
Considering an appeal from the district court decision, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit likewise found the widespread en-
actment of the UCC insufficient to overcome the court's reading of
federal precedent.2 The court instead regarded itself bound by the
Supreme Court's treatment of a similar situation in National Met-
ropolitan Bank v. United States2 in 1945. The court of appeals
could not "find that the Supreme Court [had] itself, since 1945,
written anything which might cause us to conclude with reasonable
assurance that its Metropolitan decision is no longer viable. This
being so, we think that Metropolitan must now control the disposi-
tion of this appeal."'
The focus upon the Government's interest in its commercial
paper does not save the result reached by the district and circuit
courts, however, because it conflicts with previous Supreme Court
pronouncements about the federal government's position in relation
to private commerce. In its Clearfield opinion, the Supreme Court
23. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405(1)(c), Comment 4, states the "business risk" ration-
ale: "The principle followed is that the loss should fall upon the employer as a risk of his
business enterprise rather than upon the subsequent holder or drawee. The reasons are that
the employer is normally in a better position to prevent such forgeries by reasonable care in
the selection or supervision of his employees, or, if he is not, is at least in a better position to
cover the loss by fidelity insurance .... "
24. 288 F. Supp. at 348, quoting Brief for Plaintiff at 7. In rejecting the "business risk"
rationale, the court accepted the Government's argument that the Navy was not analogous
to a private industry in its selection of "employees," nor could it prevent forgeries through
character investigation systems, or protect against loss through fidelity insurance.
25. United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 438 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir.
1971).
26. 323 U.S. 454 (1945). In circumstances closely analogous to Bank of America, see note
19 supra, a civilian clerk at the paymaster's office of the Marine Corps forged pay and travel
mileage vouchers in the names of certain officers. The Government issued the appropriate
checks payable to the officers and delivered them to the clerk for distribution. The clerk
forged the payee's endorsements, then endorsed them in his own name either to cash or
deposit the checks. The Government recovered the moneys paid to National Metropolitan
Bank, the last of two banks that expressly guaranteed the prior endorsements. The Supreme
Court specifically held that federal, rather than local, law controlled the rights and liabilities
concerning commercial paper which the Government issued. Id at 456.
27. 438 F.2d at 1214.
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asserted: "The United States as drawee of commercial paper stands
in no different light than any other drawee."28 The Court was yet
more emphatic regarding the ordinary treatment of the federal
government in United States v. National Exchange Bank5 : "The
United States does business on business terms . . . .LIt] is not
excepted from the general rule by the largeness of its dealings and
its having to employ agents to do what if done by a principal in
person would leave no room for doubt."so Furthermore,
Metropolitan did not merit the dispositive weight accorded it-by the
court of appeals since when it was decided, the prevailing law would
have permitted any drawer, not just the Government, to recover
from the presenting bank.3 1 At the time of Bank of America, the
United States should have stood "as any other drawer" under the
then prevailing law, the Code, 2 with the result that recovery should
have been denied. In following the result of Metropolitan when the
prevailing law had changed, the Bank of America courts misapplied
the uniformity requirement of Clearfield.
While acknowledging the general utility of the UCC in federal
contract disputes,3 the federal boards of contract appeals have been
as reluctant as the courts to apply the Code in the face of contrary
federal precedent. In its denial of a request for rehearing in Meeks
Transfer Co.,34 the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals ap-
28. 318 U.S. at 369.
29. 270 U.S. 527 (1926).
30. Id. at 534-35.
31. 288 F. Supp. at 345. Under the prevailing law at the time of Metropolitan, the Govern-
ment's failure to discover the fraud perpetrated by its employee did not absolve the bank from
liability for the amounts involved in the fraud. The Court declared that allocation of liability
to be "almost unanimously accepted by state and federal courts. No persuasive reasons have
been suggested to us why it should not be accepted as the general federal rule." 323 U.S. at
457. The Court's rationale should lead to the adoption of the UCC as the controlling federal
law today since the states have accepted it almost unanimously.
32. See 13 B.C. Ihm & CoM. L. Rav. 586 (1972). "Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
inaction [denial of certiorari, 404 U.S. 864 (1971)], it is submitted that the federal appellate
court in Bank of America should have interpreted Metropolitan as allowing a result based
on prevailing principles of general commercial law." Id. at 601. Cf. Gorrell & Weed, Erie
Railroad: Ten Years After, 9 Oxo L.J. 276, 296 (1948).
33. See note 1 supra.
34. ASBCA No. 11819, 68-1 B.C.A. 7063. Meeks Transfer operated an independent ware-
house in which it held certain property as bailee, pursuant to a contract with the United
States. A fire destroyed the warehouse and all of its contents. In the subsequent legal dispute,
the bailee established its due care and proved the external origin of the fire, thereby overcom-
ing an inference of negligence on its paTt. The Armed Services Board found that the ultimate
burden of proof of negligence rested upon the Government as bailor. Since the bailee had
[Vol. 16:395
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parently was the first board to address a conflict between the UCC
and federal common law of contracts. In its request for reconsidera-
tion, the Government argued that the UCC should control the issue
of evidentiary burdens of.proof and persuasion, reasoning that the
Code, having been enacted by a majority of the states, constituted
the prevailing federal law of bailment.5 The first decision of the
armed services board 6 had relied upon two federal cases37 for the
rule that the ultimate burden of proof rested on the bailor; the
Government apparently believed that the UCC would redistribute
that burden.38 Rejecting the request for reconsideration, the Board
overcome the adverse inference and the Government had failed to establish negligence, the
Board resolved the negligence issue in favor of the bailee. Meeks Transfer Co., ASBCA No.
11819, 67-2 B.C.A. 6567. The Government asked for reconsideration and urged the Board
to apply the UCC, but the Board refused. Meeks Transfer Co., ASBCA No. 11819,68-1 B.C.A.
7063.
35. Meeks Transfer Co., ASBCA No. 11819, 67-2 B.C.A. 6567, at 32,644.
36. Meeks Transfer Co., ASBCA No. 11819, 67-2 B.C.A. 6567. See note 34 supra.
37. Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 110-11
(1941); Orrwell v. Wilmington Iron Works, Inc., 185 F.2d 181, 183-84 (4th Cir. 1950).
38. The UCC permits the various states to provide different burdens of proof for carriers
and warehousemen. Section 7-403(1)(b) intentionally leaves unresolved the rule regarding the
burden of proof of negligence:
(1) The bailee must deliver the goods to a person entitled under the docu-
ment who complies with subsections (2) and (3), unless and to the extent that
the bailee establishes any of the following: ... (b) damage to or delay, loss or
destruction of the goods for which the bailee is not liable [, the burden of
establishing negligence in such cases is on the person entitled under the docu-
ment] ....
UmFo i Coha~msa L Con § 7-403(1)(b) (bracketed language indicates that states may dif-
fer). The official comment indicates that federal legislation and state regulatory laws often
have codified the responsibilities for particular classes of bailees. The comment further pro-
vides that in the absence of a specific statutory provision, "the common law will prevail
subject to the minimum standard of reasonable care prescribed by Sections 7-204 and 7-309
... ." UNXFOMt COMMERCAL Con § 7-403, Comment 3. The two sections referenced specifi-
cally separate warehousemen from carriers. Section 7-204(1) leaves the ultimate burden of
proof upon the bailor and explains the reasoning in Meeks. Section 7-204(1) states in perti-
nent part that a warehouseman "is not liable for damages which could not have been avoided
by the exercise of such care" as a "reasonably careful man would exercise . . ." UatroMn
COMMERCIAL CODa § 7-204(1). One commentator has clarified the duty imposed upon a ware-
houseman by the Code, stating: "A warehouseman not only has the duty to exercise due care
but likewise he has the burden of explaining any loss or disappearance of the property bailed
with him, although the warehouseman is not liable if he can show that in spite of the exercise
of due care he was not able to deliver the goods to the holder of the receipt." 3 R. AND sON,
ANDER SON ON Ta Usromi COMMERCML CODE § 7-204:4, at 528-29 (2d ed. 1971).
There is a need to distinguish two different burdens: the burden of going forward with
evidence and the ultimate burden of pursuasion. The Supreme Court demonstrated the
different burdens in Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S.
104 (1941), where the Court regarded a party as a "bailee for hire," like a warehouseman,
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stated: "While we have not considered the Uniform Commercial
Code as enunciative of Federal common law, we have in the past
looked to this Code for guidance when there was no other Federal
precedent available. Adequate legal precedent here being available,
we do not come to a consideration of the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code."3 The decision supports the proposition that the
UCC, while it may be a source of federal law,4" is not federal law
itself.
Machlett Laboratories, Inc. ,41 is another of the few cases similar
to Meeks in which a direct conflict between the Code and federal
precedent has been perceived.42 In Machlett, the contractor was
denied an equitable adjustment in a government requirements con-
tract, although the Government's estimates of its needs proved
greater than actual orders since, subsequent to execution of the
contract, the procuring activity discovered it had an excess amount
of the contract items in stock. Because the Government had acted
in good faith the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals held
rather than a "common carrier." Id. at 108. The opinion placed the ultimate burden of proof
upon the bailor. The bailee had the burden of going forward to overcome the presumption of
negligence, after the bailor made a prima facie case by establishing that the bailee failed to
return the bailed property. Id. at 111.
39. ASBCA No. 11819, 68-1 B.C.A. T 7063, at 32,644. A federal board should follow the
Code when, as in Meeks, its language is an attempted codification of the federal rule. See
note 38 supra. The conflict among federal courts regarding the issue of burden allocation
further supports the application of the UCC. Compare Super Service Motor Freight Co. v.
United States, 350 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Cloverleaf Cold Storage Co.,
286 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Iowa 1968), with Commercial Molasses Corp. v. NewYork TankBarge
Corp., 314 U.S. 104 (1941); Gulf Wave Towing Co. v. Mitchell, 176 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La.
1959). The conflict among the courts results in great part from differing interpretations of
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134 (1964). A similar conflict also exists
among the boards of contract appeals. Compare Sloan's Moving & Storage Co., ASECA No.
10187, 65-1 B.C.A. 4685; H. & R. Transfer & Storage Co., ASCA No. 8079, 1964 B.C.A.
4315, with Brandon Transfer & Storage Co., ASBCA No. 12734, 69-1 B.C.A. 117643. Applica-
tion of the Code in Meeks would have created the same result, hastened the uniformity sought
by the drafters of the Code, and followed the policy of using the UCC "as a source of federal
law."
40. See note 1 supra.
41. ASBCA No. 16194, 73-1 B.C.A. 1 9929.
42. Most boards apparently have not encountered cases which they perceived to present a
conflict between the UCC and federal precedent. Noting that it found no conflict in the
resolution of the issues presented in Federal Pac. Elec. Co., IBCA No. 334,1964 B.C.A. T 4494,
the Interior Board of Contract Appeals asserted: "[R]ules of law that have received wide
recognition among the states have frequently been adopted as persuasive guides to what the
federal law should be .. .. The sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code...
[have] been viewed as an appropriate source of such rules." Id. at 21,585.
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that federal precedent prevented imposing liability on the Govern-
ment.4 Unlike Code section 2-306(1)," the federal rule would not
permit recovery by the contractor, even though the quantities or-
dered were "unreasonably disproportionate"4 5 to the estimates. De-
spite the holding of the nearly one-century-old precedent, Brawley
v. United States,4" the Government's interest in uniformity would
not seem overly threatened by the "unreasonably disproportionate"
test of section 2-306. 47
State Law as a Source of Federal Law
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the rationale for the
Clearfield decision primarily concerned the Government's need to
have its commercial dealings subject to uniform law. In Bank of
America National Trust & Savings Association v. Parnell48 the
Court characterized the basis for the Clearfield doctrine as "stated
with unclouded explicitness: 'The issuance of commercial paper by
the United States is on a vast scale and transactions in that paper
from issuance to payment will commonly occur in several states.
The application of state law, even without the conflict of laws rules
of the forum, would subject the rights and duties of the United
States to exceptional uncertainty.' "49 Clearly, the crucial emphasis
in the Clearfield decision was the need to save the federal govern-
ment from encountering conflicting state laws. With the wide enact-
43. ASBCA No. 16194, 73-1 B.C.A. 9929, at 46,562-63.
44. UNWuOass COMERCIAL CODE § 2-306(1) provides: "A term which measures the quantity
by the output of the seller or the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or
requirements as may occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably dispropor-
tionate to any stated estimate... may be tendered or demanded."
45. See note 44 supra.
46. 96 U.S. 168 (1878).
47. Perusal of the contract at issue in Machlett provides a further basis for questioning the
decision. Rather than preferring federal precedent over the UCC to reach its decision, the
board could have reached the same result by relying upon the intent of the parties as ex-
pressed in the following clause which was included in the contract: "The quantities of sup-
plies or services specified herein are estimates only, and are not purchased hereby. Except
as may be otherwise provided herein, in the event the Government's requirements for supplies
or services set forth in the Schedule do not result in orderi in the amounts or quantities
described as 'estimated' or 'maximum' in the Schedule, such event will not constitute the
basis for an equitable price adjustment under this contract." ASBCA No. 16194, 73-1 B.C.A.
9929, at 46,557 (emphasis omitted). Had the case been decided pursuant to the Code,
section 1-102(3) would have permitted the parties to use the language of the quoted clause
to "contract out" of section 2-306(1).
48. 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
49. Id. at 33, quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
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ment of the UCC, the possibility of conflict in substantive law prac-
tically is eliminated on those issues which the Code addresses. Even
the presence of optional Code provisions" poses no threat to federal
uniformity, since federal law utilizing the UCC generally could fol-
low the most widely enacted option. Different state court interpreta-
tions of the Code could be a source of conflict," but variant state
interpretations of the Code need not create an obstacle to realizing
a uniform approach. The federal courts need not defer to any one
state's interpretation of the UCC; they instead can interpret the
Code themselves as a "source of Federal law."52 The bank argued
for such an approach in Bank of America:3 it asked not that the
federal court adopt the UCC, but instead that it utilize the Code's
established uniformity in fashioning federal law.
The Supreme Court itself has recognized that the use of federal
common law is not always required even where adequate federal
legal precedent is available. For example, although United States
v. Yazell54 concerned a government coitract, the Court refused to
apply federal law, reasoning that the federal interest did not over-
ride the desirability of leaving to state law the resolution of ques-
tions concerning the chattel mortgage at issue.55 The crucial factor
in determining the application of state law in cases in which federal
court jurisdiction is not premised upon diversity of citizenship is the
assessment of the importance of the federal interest. 6 Yazell demon-
strates that the federal interest is not always so compelling that
courts must apply federal law in every case in which the United
States is a party and the dispute concerns a government contract.
Furthermore, the mere presence of an important federal interest
should not foreclose the use of state law, particularly where the state
statute comports with the federal interest in uniformity and pro-
motes a national system of commercial law.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United States v.
Wegematic Corp.,1 presented an alternative to the view that federal
50. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-403(1)(b) (1972 version).
51. See note 38 supra.
52. Cf. SPEIDEL, SuiMMRs & WrTE, COMMERC=AL TRANSACrIONS 32 (1969).
53. 288 F. Supp. at 347. See notes 19-32 supra & accompanying text.
54. 383 U.S. 341 (1966).
55. Id. at 352-53.
56. See C. Wmr, FEDERAL COURTS § 60 (2d ed. 1970); 7 B.C. IND. & Com. L. RIv. 1021,
1024-25 (1966).
57. 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
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business dealings must be governed only by federal common law.
Acknowledging the value of utilizing state uniform law in the federal
courts, the court stated: "When the states have gone so far in
achieving the desirable goal of a uniform law governing commercial
transactions, it would be a distinct disservice to insist on a different
one for the segment of commerce, important but still small in rela-
tion to the total, consisting of transactions with the United
States.""8 Because the court did not find a conflict between the UCC
and federal precedent, " the court was unconcerned with the prob-
lem the board perceived in Meeks."1 Although not directly address-
ing the issue of potential conflict, the court nevertheless expressed
strong support for the acceptance of the Code in business transac-
tions, including those involving the federal government."
Similar reasoning led the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
to require the United States to stand like any other creditor in
United States v. Hext.12 Carefully distinguishing between the re-
quirement that courts apply federal law and the freedom to utilize
applicable uniform state law to shape federal law, the court refused
to apply federal precedent mechanically. Finding neither "reason
nor necessity for fashioning a specialized, esoteric body of federal
law,' 63 the court applied instead the "general principles of commer-
cial law,"8 stressing that the old federal common law was not as
representative of those principles as is "the principle fount of gen-
eral commercial law governing secured transactions, . . . Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code."' " Hext demonstrates that the
courts can utilize the Code to satisfy the federal need for govern-
ment contract uniformity enunciated in Clearfield and Allegheny;
at the same time they can draw upon the Code's modem rules of
commercial law to shape litigation.
Advantages of Drawing upon the UCC
When no commercially significant differences exist between gov-
58. Id. at 676.
59. Compare Austin Co. v. United States, 314 F.2d 518,521 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
830 (1963), with UNIFORM COERCIAL CODE § 2-615.
60. See notes 34-39 supra & accompanying text.
61. 360 F.2d at 676.
62. 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971).
63. Id. at 809.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 809-10.
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ernment and private contracts, use of a separate system of law for
each creates unjustifiable barriers in the smooth conduct of com-
mercial affairs. Moreover, the Uniform Commercial Code, as an
attempt to assimilate the most workable concepts of commercial
law, exhibits several advantages over the patchwork of federal deci-
sional law derived from the happenstance of adversary litigation.
Application of the Code to government contracts can remove the
inconvenience and increased costs which the dual system of laws
imposes on contractors. Because of the wide adoption of the UCC,
contractors generally write their contracts and conduct the bulk of
their business with reference to it;"6 when entering into government
contracts, however, they must deal with different, sometimes con-
flicting, law. The burden to the legal system and to the contractors
of continuing dual systems of law, entailing the use of government
contracting specialists to litigate what should be ordinary business
disputes, is particularly unjustified in view of Judge Friendly's ob-
servation in Wegematic that such contracts constitute only a small
portion of the nation's business. 7
The increasing complexity of federal government contract law"
has produced a situation in which only the largest contractors truly
appreciate the multitudinous aspects of their commitment; less so-
phisticated contractors often discover to their detriment that gov-
ernment contracting is not the process they had imagined. 9 Need-
less contract disputes result from a failure to appreciate the differ-
ences between public and private contract law. Contractors might
not have undertaken their obligations had they known, for example,
that courts would incorporate Armed Services Procurement Regula-
tions (ASPR) clauses into form contracts.7" The escalating volume7 '
66. See note 58 supra & accompanying text.
67. 360 F.2d at 676.
68. For comments on the complexity of government contracting, see Speidel, What Should
the Law Schools Do About Federal Government Contracts?, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 371 (1966).
69. For the results of a survey to determine whether small businessmen receive their "fair"
share of government contracts, see Schrieber, SmallBusiness and Government Procurement,
29 LAw & CoNmTA. PRoB. 390 (1964). The small businessman's frustration at dealing with
the government contracting process is illustrated by one of the "typical" responses received
in the survey: "'Tihe unfair part is all the paper work that is involved in a Government
contract'...." Id. at 396.
70. G.L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 424 (Ct. Cl.), rehearing
denied, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963).
71. "Over the past 20 years, Government procurement has increased sixfold." SuMMARY OF
THE REPORT OF Ta COMMSSION ON GovERNMENT PnocuRNT 1 (1972).
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and growing complexity of government contracting will make the
problems of dual legal standards increasingly difficult for contrac-
tors. General application of the UCC, on the other hand, would
reduce the peculiarities of government contracting by utilizing the
rules with which contractors are familiar to settle contract dis-
putes. 2
Other incidental benefits could accrue from consistent resort to
the Code's resolution of contract difficulties. Application of the
Code in commercial paper cases similar to Bank of America3 could
have the salutary effect of encouraging the exercise of greater care
by government employees who oversee the Government's payrolls
because the Government no longer could expect preferential treat-
ment from its courts; rather, they would hold it to the same stan-
dard of care when issuing checks as any other drawer. Moreover, the
difficulty of determining when a federal financial interest overrides
state interests offers another reason for federal use of the Code.
Courts can invoke a general rule of applying the Code more easily
than they can delineate guides to the situations in which the federal
interest in protecting public moneys is paramount.74
Perhaps the most fundamental advantage the UCC can contrib-
ute to federal government contract law is the greater certainty and
comprehensiveness of a code system of law. Learned Hand, for ex-
ample, noted that the states' uniform negotiable instruments law
was "a source of 'federal law' . . . more certain" than the general
federal case law.75 Furthermore, federal courts and contract appeals
72. Commercial rules may, however, have no place in situations of unique governmental
interest, such as termination for convenience, see Armed Services Procurement Regulation §
7-602.5. See also Mitchell & Tracy, Terminations of Government Contracts: Recent
Developments, 14 WM. & MARY L. luv. 817 (1973).
73. See notes 19-32 supra & accompanying text.
74. Cf. Peterfreund, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice, 33 N.Y.U.L. Buv. 483, 487 (1958):
"A 'twilight zone' between matters of federal and local interest now exists, with few guide-
posts along the way. ... But only future litigation will determine what constitutes a 'federal
interest, to be governed by federal law' and what is 'essentially a private transaction' to be
governed by local law."
75. New York, N.H. & H.R. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 180 F.2d 241, 244 (2d Cir.
1950). Judge Hand elaborated upon the value of the uniform state statutes as follows:
The purpose of the doctrine that the transactions of such [federal] corpora-
tions are not subject to state law, is that such agencies, being national in their
scope and aim, shall not be forced to shape their transactions to conform to the
varying laws of the places where they occur, or are to be carried out. Uniformity
is thought to be essential to the convenient and speedy dispatch of their opera-
tions. However, the Negotiable Instruments Law has been enacted in every state
1974]
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boards, being more tightly constrained by the teachings of one tri-
bunal, the Supreme Court, have a greater potential than the courts
of the 50 states for enhancing the uniformity and certainty promised
by the Uniform Commercial Code. By consulting the official text of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws,76 rather than the more localized versions enacted by particu-
lar states, federal courts and boards can encourage dissemination of
the draftsmen's interpretations of Code provisions to further aug-
ment the uniformity of the Code's application. Since the commis-
sion seeks to have the Code reflect developing commercial practice, 77
federal tribunals should apply the most frequently enacted option
when a particular Code provision contains alternatives.
Judge Hand recognized that uniform state laws demonstrate
greater completeness as well as more certainty than federal common
law;7 19 the very completeness of the Code may present an obstacle,
however, because federal courts may be disinclined to apply a uni-
form act the comprehensiveness of which could discourage adapta-
tion to the exigencies of federal contracting." That judicial fear of
Code inflexibility would be ill-founded, however, because the courts
would be applying the UCC where a government contract was in the
ordinary commercial setting. When the federal government is acting
like a businessman, no reason exists for courts to treat it other than
as a businessman.81 Federal precedent, rather than commercial
of the Union, as well as in the District of Columbia; it is a source of 'federal
law'-however that phrase may be construed-more complete and more certain,
than any other which can conceivably be drawn from those sources of 'general
law' to which we were accustomed to resort in the days of Swift v. Tyson.
Id.
76. The Official Text is that published jointly by the American Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
77. The publication of a revised Article 9, for example, was a response by the Permanent
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code to a large number of non-uniform amend-
ments that had been made to the Code by various states. The revision was intended to restore
uniformity as well as to incorporate the doctrinal changes suggested by scholarly commentary
on the Code. See Wechsler, Foreword to UNmoRm ComacuL CoDE at xxxi (1972 Official
Text).
78. See note 50 supra & accompanying text.
79. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 180 F.2d 241, 244 (2d Cir.
1950). See note 75 supra.
80. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 292: "A
'code' is a pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment of a whole field of law. It
is pre-emptive in that it displaces all other law in its subject area save only that which the
code excepts."
81. See notes 28-30 supra & accompanying text.
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practice, still would control a case when a court acknowledges that
the Code satisfies the federal uniformity requirement, but holds
that another federal interest is present which dictates a different
result. The only exception to the basic rule that courts treat the
federal government like any other businessman would be in cases
of genuinely overriding national interest rather than mere financial
interest: for example, the attainment of statutorily mandated social
goals 2 or the provision of an adequate national defense. While pro-
duction of military weapons systems poses an instance of potentially
overriding federal interest, the parties can specify during contract-
ing that noncommercial law shall govern weapon contracts requir-
ing special treatment. Commercial law, on the other hand, would
govern ordinary items of military procurement common to the pri-
vate business sector.
Methods for Removing the Clearfield Bar
While various legal and commercial reasons support applying the
Uniform Commercial Code to federal government contracts, the
means for achieving that objective are limited. Although there has
been some scholarly support for the most direct route, enactment
of the Code as federal law by Congress, 4 the absence of any great
pressure in favor of such legislation would seem to preclude that
possibility as a practical alternative. Because both the boards of
contract appeals and the lower federal courts have been willing to
draw upon the Code when federal precedent does not indicate a
contrary result, 5 congressional enactment of the Code would seem
to alter the outcome of only a small number of cases; Congress thus
may be unlikely to legislate such a sweeping body of law as the Code
in an area of such little present conflict.
Resort to the federal courts presently offers little prospect of
achieving consistent application of the UCC. To achieve the desired
result, the optimum judicial avenue would be a broad declaration
82. See, e.g., Vestal, Government Contracts: The Effect of the Philadelphia Pian on the
Contractor and the Union, 15 A.F. JAG. L. Rv. 110 (1973).
83. See Umm'oP ComcIL CoDE § 1-102(3).
84. Commentators have advocated federal enactment of the Code. See Braucher, Federal
Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 100 (1951); Friendly,
In Praise of Erie--And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 383, 419-21
(1964).
85. See 20 Sw. L.J. 688 (1966); see also note 1 supra.
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by the Supreme Court that the uniform act applies to federal con-
tracts. Because this route smacks of judicial legislation, a more
likely alternative might be a definitive statement from the Supreme
Court that the Clearfield and Allegheny decisions do not preclude
looking to state law when uniform state law is available. Still more
likely, but less conclusive, would be the examination of individual
cases" to determine whether the Code should prevail over a specifi-
cally controverted federal precedent. A commercial paper case
would be particularly susceptible to judicial reevaluation because
the federal common law conflict with the Code already has gener-
ated criticism.A7 A lower federal court could reason that the histori-
cally legitimate need to formulate a policy strongly protective of the
federal government no longer existed and that a nonfederal system
of rules, reflecting uniformity and encouraging sounder business
practices by the Government, is available as grounds for decision.
Because cases presenting a direct conflict between federal precedent
and the Code are rare, however, reliance upon a case-by-case ap-
proach to incorporate particular Code teachings into the federal law
promises only slow and sporadic results.
In contrast to the limitations of attempting to achieve Code appli-
cation to government contracts through legislative and judicial ac-
tion, the procurement agencies themselves have the means to reach
that objective by incorporating UCC provisions into standard con-
tract forms. In Dressler v. Wilson,8 a lower federal court held that
heads of government departments have implied authority to pre-
scribe reasonable terms and conditions in their contracts. 9 That
implied authority, the Sommerville opinion notwithstanding,"
86. See S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558 (1946), in which the Supreme Court
declared: "In determining the meaning and effect of contracts to which the United States is
a party, the governing rules of law must be finally declared by this Court." Id. at 564.
87. See note 32 supra.
88. 155 F. Supp. 373 (D.D.C. 1957).
89. Id. at 375.
90. See notes 15-18 supra. The Sommerville opinion may not be the bar to invoking the
Code that its assertive language regarding the primacy of federal law might indicate. First,
the controverted Farmers Home Administration (FHA) security agreement attempted to
make a specific state statute determinative, 324 F.2d at 714, rather than drawing generally
upon the Code as a source of federal law in the manner advocated by this Comment. More-
over, the litigation before the Sommerville court was not between the two parties to the
security agreement, but between the FHA as lender and a third party auctioneer who sold
the borrower's goods at the direction of the borrower without knowing of the security agree-
ment covering the goods. Id. Rather than preventing the Government from entering into an
enforceable contract invoking the UCC, the Sommerville opinion thus may be interpreted
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should be sufficiently broad to include the power to declare the
Code, or any other uniform state act, to be the applicable federal
law for a contract. While numerous statutes require the inclusion of
certain provisions in government contracts,1 no statutory bar pro-
hibits procuring authorities from voluntary incorporation of the
UCC12 Although procuring agencies may have hesitated to include
the Code because they believe that Clearfield and Allegheny bar
resort to any state law to determine rights in a federal contract, 3
closer attention to the rationale of those cases demonstrates that the
bar is illusory; the uniformity attainable'by use of the UCC would
further, rather than frustrate, the policy of those cases:
Inclusion of Code provisions in government contracts or incorpo-
ration of the Code by reference as applicable law offers several ad-
vantages to the Government. Litigation in the procurement process
could be lessened by avoiding the uncertainties inherent in causing
supplier to function under a dual system of law. Although no evi-
dence has been found to prove that private contractors are dis-
suaded from competing for government contracts by the prospect of
being bound by an unfamiliar set of federal precedents, it seems
only as a refusal to estop the Government from the pursuit of federal law remedies against a
third party who had no knowledge of, therefore no reliance upon, the agreement between the
Government and the borrower to use state law.
91. For discussion of the incorporation of statutes into the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations, see J. PAUL, UNIm STA7ES GovERNmemT CoNTRACTS & SUBcONTRACTS, 18-40
(1964). See also note 82 supra.
92. Department of Defense Instruction 5126.3, December 20, 1961, 1 Gov'T CoNT. E.
825.50 (A), provides that the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) Committee's
approval of matters other than those of major policy, "shall be considered as having the final
approval of the Military Departments and of the Defense Supply Agency without further
review by them, and upon approval by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Logistics), or his authorized representative, regulations or directives developed by the Com-
mittee will be published without further consideration."
The Federal Procurement Regulation (FPR) Committee civilian counterpart is the Inter-
agency Procurement Policy Committee. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.010 (1974): "For the purpose of
advising and assisting the General Services Administration in its Government-wide program
for the development of uniform procurement policies and procedures, an Interagency Procure-
ment Policy Committee, chaired by GSA, has been established." The expressed aims of the
ASPR and the FPR to achieve uniformity, however, focus upon administrative uniformity
within the procurement agencies and not the uniformity of applicable law.
93. In a letter stating the Treasury Department's position concerning a conflict between a
UCC provision and federal common law, a representative of the office of the General Counsel
stated: "[This Department has no basis on which to adopt the Uniform Commercial Code
change with regard to an employer's liability in a padded payroll situation when the Federal
Courts have not applied the change." Letter from Mr. Wolf Haber, Assistant General Coun-
sel, Department of the Treasury to Mr. Donald D. Harmata, Sept. 25, 1974.
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reasonable to believe that the peculiarities of government contract-
ing tend to narrow the field of bidders to those who are willing to
develop not just the skills of an efficient manufacturer of goods, but
also the legal expertise required for dealing with the procurement
agencies on their own uncommon terms. 4 Another potential advan-
tage of applying the Code is the possible refinement of government
payroll and inventory procedures once the defenses afforded by the
specific holdings of Clearfield95 and MachIett" are removed. Incor-
poration of the Code as applicable law entails no necessary -loss of
flexibility, since it is entirely consistent with the philosophy of the
Code for parties to contract out of specific provisions when such is
their intent;17 agencies could benefit, however, from the
predictability of using the Code as a standard reference to resolve
questions not provided for specifically by contract. The virtue of
predictability is enhanced under the Code by the determined effort
of its draftsmen to reflect the most commercially reasonable solu-
tion to contractual disputes. Although procurement agencies might
lose the advantage of some particularly favorable precedents, the
fact that the Government itself occasionally has attempted to rely
upon the Code 8 should demonstrate that what is commercially rea-
sonable is not necessarily adverse to the interest of a procurement
agency.
Conclusion
With the almost unanimous adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code, there now exists a comprehensive body of commercial law
that could satisfy the uniformity requirements enunciated in
Clearfield and Allegheny in a manner more predictable and more
reflective of modern business practice than that afforded by the
existing federal common law of contracts. A broadly worded Su-
preme Court endorsement of the Code as a source of federal law for
federal government contracts would remove the obstacles to UCC
application that now are perceived to exist as a result of the suprem-
acy clause, the doctrine of stare decisis, and especially the Clearfield
94. Procurement policy favors broadening the range of potential competitors for govern-
ment contracts, especially to include small businessmen. See Schrieber, supra note 69.
95. See note 6 supra.
96. See notes 41-47 supra & accompanying text.
97. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(3).
98. See notes 16, 38 supra & accompanying text.
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doctrine. Absent such a declaration by the Court, consistent appli-
cation of the Code to federal contracts most likely could be achieved
by the slow case-by-case overruling of federal precedent by the Su-
preme Court or, more quickly, by referencing the Code as applicable
law in the contracts written by procurement agencies. Some identi-
fiable transactions do justify according the government special
treatment in the public interest. When a procurement agency is
engaged in commerce as a businessman, however, there is no need
to govern its dealings by a distinct system of law; it then should do
"business on business terms."9
99. United States v. National Exchange Bank, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926).
